From
Critics to Apologists:
The Historical Relationship Between Liberalism and Islam
Roy
Hanson
The word “liberal arts” was first
used in
England
during the Renaissance to describe “the seven attainments directed to
intellectual enlargement, not immediate practical purpose, and thus
deemed worthy of a free man.” In effect, this term was used to
describe the quest for knowledge for its own sake as opposed to the
learning of a trade. It was not until the Enlightenment that
“liberal” took on a political use, meaning "free from
prejudice, tolerant," and "tending in favor of freedom and
democracy.” Ambrose Bierce’s “Devil’s Dictionary” (1911) shows
that long before ideals like multiculturalism, not only conservatives
were viewing liberalism with suspicion:
"Conservative,
n, A statesman who is enamored of existing evils, as distinguished from
the Liberal, who wishes to replace them with others."
Consistent with the liberal heritage of
toleration is the reluctance of modern liberals to criticize non-Western
cultures. Inconsistent with this same heritage is the tendency of many
liberals to overlook the reactionary components of the cultures they
often defend. The pioneers of liberalism in the 18th and 19th
centuries were not subject to this paradox. Their efforts to reform
their own world did not compromise their confidence towards the society
that gave them the tools to change their world. Hence, long before
liberalism was corrupted by the self-censorship political correctness,
there was nothing anti-liberal about taking other cultures and religions
to task over their incompatibility with liberalism.
In his masterpiece on good governance, ”The Spirit of Laws,”
(1748) Barron de Montesquieu condemns Muslim society for its tyranny,
slavery, and misogyny. The core of his argument is in Book 24, Chapter
4:
“It
is a misfortune to human nature when religion is given by a conqueror.
The Mahometan religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon
men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded.”
Although Montesquieu called for separation of church and state,
he never diminishes the role of Christianity in providing the moral
guidance necessary for Western civilization’s continuing success. This
is evident in preceding paragraph:
“While the Mahometan princes incessantly give or receive death, the
religion of the Christians renders their princes less timid, and
consequently less cruel. The prince confides in his subjects, and the
subjects in the prince. How admirable the religion which, while it only
seems to have in view the felicity of the other life, continues the
happiness of this!”
The Baron-philosopher was not making
this up. For centuries, fratricide had become a common means for
consolidating power in the Ottoman sultanate. Montesquieu was also among
the 140 contributors to the groundbreaking 72,000 article Encyclopedia
compiled by Denis Diderot between 1751 and 1772. His contribution to
this monumental achievement can be discerned in some passages that are
reiterated from the Spirit of Laws, but unattributed articles original
to the Encyclopedia are equally ruthless in their depiction of Islam and
Muslim society. Take for example this commentary under the topic of
“Fanatisme” in Volume 6, page 393, paragraph 42:
"When government is based absolutely [or
completely] on religion, such as that of the Mahometans, then its
fanaticism is turned outward, and turns these people into the common
enemy of mankind."
In the spirit of the time, the section
on “Christianisme” in Volume 3, page 381, paragraph 18 also
acknowledges abuses perpetrated in the name of the church, but
attributes these to the people who abuse Christianity, not the religion
itself.
“Christianity, of course, has known its own wars of religion; and
the flames of those wars have often proved catastrophic for Christian
peoples. This proves that there is nothing so innately good that it
cannot be abused by human malignity. Fanaticism is a disease that, from
time to time, produces germs capable of infecting the globe, but this is
a vice not of Christianity itself, but of individual believers.”
While many secular humanists today will
dismiss this as a “Christian” perspective, the struggle against the
authority of the church that characterized the Enlightenment also made
it possible for atheists and other secularists to dissect the very idea
of having religion in the first place. David Hume’s meticulous
development of empirical theory is credited with paving the way for
future philosophers, politicians, and scientists to think well beyond
the church dogma. Often denounced for his alleged atheism, Hume’s
condemnation of the Koran in his essay “Of the Standard of Taste”
(1757) could hardly fit the stereotype of the dogmatic Christian making
ritualistic denunciations of other faiths:
“But would we know, whether the pretended prophet had really
attained a just sentiment of morals? Let us attend to his narration; and
we shall soon find, that he bestows praise on such instances of
treachery, inhumanity, cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly
incompatible with civilized society. No steady rule of right seems there
to be attended to; and every action is blamed or praised, so far only as
it is beneficial or hurtful to the true believers.”
Why did a secularist like Hume still feel the need to strongly
denounce a book that Christians were already indoctrinated to reject?
Could this have served to appease conservatives already displeased with
his lack of faith in God? If this is true, one would surely think that
those who merited from Hume’s legacy of skepticism would no longer
find it necessary to “demonize” other faiths, but the deconstruction
of Islam persisted well into the next century.
The Utilitarians created one of the
first ethical formulas of the modern age that eliminated the need for
divine guidance. This movement pioneered by Jeremy Bentham and further
developed by John Stuart Mill evaluated the righteousness of an action
exclusively on the basis of its benefit to society. Contrary to one of
the key principles of the Enlightenment, the concept of natural rights
was rejected because its requirement of a divine being was outside the
scope of Utilitarian theory.
Unlike many his predecessors, Bentham
did not excoriate Islam’s foremost prophet. In Chapter 2 of “Of the
Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation” (1843), he
regards Muhammad as an “extraordinary” man whose charisma and good
intentions might have done great things for Arab society had he been
endowed with “more knowledge and more genius.” But from the
Utilitarian standpoint, the good intentions of the prophet were not
enough to overcome the inherent barbarism of the society where he grew
up. As a man of his time, Muhammad lacked the intellectual resources
that “might have bestowed on these nations, laws more consonant with
their happiness, and less hostile to the human race.” In effect, based
exclusively on its consequences, Islam is condemned by Bentham not as a
false religion, but as a way of life that is antagonistic to human
welfare.
Like Bentham, John Stuart Mill also focuses on results. In “The
Utility of Religion” (1874), he describes the dangers of religious
fundamentalism:
“…there is real evil consequent on ascribing a supernatural origin
to the received maxims of morality…(thereby) consecrat(ing) the whole
of them, and protect(ing) them from being discussed or criticized. So
that if among the moral doctrines received as a part of religion, there
be any which are imperfect…(or) no longer suited to the changes that
have taken place in human relations …these doctrines are considered
equally binding on the conscience with the noblest, most permanent and
most universal precepts of Christ. Wherever morality is supposed to be
of supernatural origin, morality is stereotyped; as law is, for the same
reason, among believers in the Koran.”
Mill was an agnostic who used Islam as
the cautionary example of religious extremism. Whether or not Mill
believed that both Christianity and Islam are equally prone to the
ravages of fundamentalism is not clear in this passage. On one hand, he
praises the teachings of Christ. On the other hand, he warns against the
danger of believing that morality comes from God. Nevertheless, it is
common knowledge that even Christians who do not necessarily view the
Bible as the infallible word of God usually do believe that its highest
principles are of divine origin. If this also qualifies under Mill’s
precaution against the belief in “supernatural morality” why does he
single out Muslim society?
The right of devout Christians to
discuss and even criticize parts of the Bible for their accuracy in
revealing God’s word is a hallmark of Western society. The Reformation
has made belief in divine morality compatible with this freedom in
nearly all sects of Christianity, hence, there is little danger of
“imperfect” portions of the Bible being placed on the same level of
more “universal precepts” found in the Gospels. In contrast, for any
Muslim to treat the Koran as anything short of the direct word of God is
nothing short of blasphemy. Therefore, the Koran is much more likely to
bring about the “stereotyped morality” whereby rational analysis is
strongly discouraged.
In this stirring passage from Chapter 2
of “The Subjection of Women” (1869), Mill uses the Islamic analogy
to praise the sacrifice of those who have fought against oppression by
the church in the past, and regards Christian theocracy as a perversion
Christianity’s very essence:
“To pretend that Christianity was intended to stereotype existing
forms of government and society, and protect them against change, is to
reduce it to the level of Islamism or of Brahminism. It is precisely
because Christianity has not done this, that it has been the religion of
the progressive portion of mankind, and Islamism, Brahminism, etc. have
been those of the stationary portions; or rather (for there is no such
thing as a really stationary society) of the declining portions. There
have been abundance of people, in all ages of Christianity, who tried to
make it something of the same kind; to convert us into a sort of
Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible for a Koran, prohibiting all
improvement: and great has been their power, and many have had to
sacrifice their lives in resisting them. But they have been resisted,
and the resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us what we
are to be.”
Unlike John Stuart Mill, French
politician and author Alexis de Tocqueville defies categorization. The
extraordinarily range of insightful observations found in both volumes
of “Democracy in
America
” has made it a popular reference for journalists, politicians, and
professors of social studies from both sides of the political spectrum.
Mill’s praise for the first volume of this masterpiece in the 1835
October issue of the London Review no doubt played a significant role in
the public’s eager anticipation for the publication of a second volume
five years later.
Like Mill, Tocqueville characterizes
Christianity as a religion that adapts to change but Tocqueville gives
reasons for this that are more clear and satisfying. In Chapter V of
Volume 2 he attributes the progressiveness of Christian society to its
ability to distinguish between core belief and ritual:
“The principal opinions which constitute a creed, and which
theologians call articles of faith, must be very carefully distinguished
from the accessories connected with them. Religions are obliged to hold
fast to the former, whatever be the peculiar spirit of the age; but they
should take good care not to bind themselves in the same manner to the
latter at a time when everything is in transition. The permanence of
external and secondary things seems to me to have a chance of enduring
only when civil society is itself static; under any other circumstances
I am inclined to regard it as dangerous.”
Then Tocqueville specifies the dangers
inherent to any religion that micromanages the lives of its followers:
“A religion which became more insistent in details, more inflexible,
and more burdened with small observances during the time that men became
more equal would soon find itself limited to a band of fanatic zealots
in the midst of a skeptical multitude.”
Does this scenario sound familiar? An
earlier paragraph from the same chapter indicates exactly what religion
Tocqueville had in mind:
“Mohammed had not only religious doctrines descend from Heaven and
placed in the Koran, but political maxims, civil and criminal laws, and
scientific theories. The Gospels in contrast, speak only of the general
relations of men to God and among themselves. Outside of that they teach
nothing and oblige nothing to be believed. That alone, among a thousand
other reasons, is enough to show that the first of these two religions
cannot dominate for long in enlightened and democratic times, whereas
the second is destined to reign in these centuries as in all others.”
One would be hard-pressed to believe
that prejudice played a significant role in such a meticulous and
humanistic comparison between Christianity and Islam. In the same
chapter, Tocqueville stresses the importance of religion in curbing
selfish desires of democratic peoples by placing their desires “above
and beyond the treasures of earth.”
Tocqueville also traveled to
Algeria
and petitioned to put an end to slavery in all French colonies, but his
observation and subsequent criticism of slavery and racism in
America
did not prevent him from seeing the hope and promise embodied in
America
’s democratic experiment. Liberals who believe the prison abuses of
Abu Ghraib completely invalidate
America
’s role in promoting human rights in the
Middle East
could learn from Tocqueville’s sense of perspective. This trite
article by Nicolas Kristoff concerning the apocalyptic “Left Behind”
series (Jesus and Jihad, NY Times, 7/ 17/04) provides a stark contrast
to Tocqueville’s ability to see the big picture:
“I don't think the readers of ‘Glorious Appearing’ will ram
planes into buildings. But we did imprison thousands of Muslims here and
abroad after 9/11, and ordinary Americans joined in the torture of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib in part because of a lack of empathy for the
prisoners.”
Americans can never win the war against
Islamofascism when their self-image can be punctured by the feeble logic
that there is a noteworthy connection between Christian fundamentalism
and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Never mind that the neither the
Gospels nor “Glorious Appearing” provide any justification for
Christians to hurt or kill non-Christians. Never mind that jihad
ideology served to expand Muslim territory from the 7th
century until the route of the Ottomans in
Vienna
on September 12, 1683. Never mind that no Muslim leader has apologized
for this millennia of aggression, as the Pope apologized for the 200
years of Crusades. Never mind that according to a 2003 Pew survey based
on Muslim populations in Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority and Turkey, bin Laden was
one of the three "leaders" most trusted. Why in the face of
such evidence are columnists of prestigious newspapers like the New York
Times fatuously pondering moral equivalencies between Christian
fundamentalists and Muslim terrorists?
The persistence of this double standard
even three years after 9/11 is not lost on Sam Harris (A Dialogue with a
Secularlist, Townhall, 8/24/04), who takes his fellow secularists to
task for their surrender to political correctness:
“I think it’s
profoundly ironic that most sensible statements about Islam to appear in
our culture have come from our own religious dogmatics.”
Proponents of multiculturalism may find
it difficult to credit people critical of other cultures with the
redemptive notion that the learning environment is more important than
race and pedigree, but in the debate of nature versus nurture the
empiricists of Diderot’s era believed that newborn minds are a blank
slate. If modern liberals believe that the condemnation of Nazism does
not necessarily imply malice towards the German people or even all
members of the Nazi party, by what rational basis do they refuse to
apply the same standard to a non-Western religion? No liberal would
believe that righteous people like John Rabe (who used his Nazi party
membership to save the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese during the
Nanjing
massacre) could ever exonerate Nazism for the evil it represents. Yet
how many modern liberals who buy into the “Islam means peace”
platitude even bother to think beyond the good behavior of their Muslim
friends and colleagues to take a critical look at Islam’s 1400-year
history?
Just as the word “Islam” implies
“peace,” the word “liberal” implies “freedom.” Even the
political labels “right, left, and conservative” lack the
distinction of having a meaning that is independent of context. We owe
so much of our freedom to the first liberals who lived up to this
definition. At that time, conservatives derided liberals for questioning
the birthright of aristocrats. Today’s liberals are derided for
overlooking the procrustian reality of cultures and ideologies whose
sole appeal is their claim of providing a “just” alternative to the
status quo. If the self-styled liberals of today cannot muster the
cultural self-confidence to put Islam and Islam-related political
movements under the same microscope they currently apply to Judaism,
Christianity and the Christian Right, then the liberal label will become
as farcical as that of the “Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea.”
Some will never give up on using the
preponderance of right-wing voices in elucidating Islam’s problems as
further evidence of their bigotry, but more significant than the
unilateralism of these conservatives is the deafening silence of
liberals in these discussions. It isn’t easy to participate in a
dialogue that makes minorities feel uncomfortable, but to spare an
entire people the painful privilege of soul-searching is both
patronizing and degrading. A Google search of the name Walid Shoebat
shows that by far, most interviews of this Palestinian ex-terrorist have
been conducted by news sources that lean to the right. It’s not that
the New York Times and National Public Radio have no interest in what
Mr. Shoebat has to say: Imagine the recriminations they would have to
face from their patrons after asking why this ex-Muslim had turned to
evangelical Christianity!
As we enter a conflict that may surpass
the Cold War in both duration and horror there is still time to redeem
liberalism to the greatness that made it stand so tall in the 18th
and 19th centuries. One the most moving tributes to the late
Ronald Reagan was written by Solidarity leader Lech Walesa (Opinion
Journal 6/11/04). Granted, the Reagan administration had its flaws, but
the liberals who ignore the Shoebats and latter day Walesas will only
have themselves to blame if they are once again upstaged by
conservatives in the cause of freedom.
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